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citizen to determine whether the officer is acting unlawfully. Thus the
"assist at your own peril" rule seems unjust and therefore undesirable.
Citizens should be encouraged to co-operate in law enforcement rather than
be penalized for doing so. It is a strange legal anomaly to punish a citizen
for obeying the command of an officer, vested with lawful authority to
command, and at the same time subject him to punishment if he refuses
25
or neglects to obey.
JOHN P. MAGNUSON

CIVIL RIGHTS IN WYOMING
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that the
Courtis showing heightened interest in the civil rights area. This is true
particularly in connection with the Negroid race, although not restricted
to that race.
The much publicized 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka' dealt with the admission of Negro children to a white school in
Topeka, Kansas. Three other cases, from South Carolina, Virginia and
Delaware, were consolidated with the Brown case for hearing by the
Supreme Court. In each case Negro children were denied admission to
white schools under laws requiring 2 or permitting3 school districts to
establish separate schools for Negroes. In each of the cases, except the
Delaware decision, the federal district courts had denied relief to the
parents of the Negro children under the "separate but equal" doctrine
4
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson,
which held that equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate. The Supreme Court of Delaware upheld that doctrine but
ordered that the children be admitted because of inequality of the
schools. 5

The Plessy case involved not education, but transportation, and the
Brown case was the first one that presented the question of whether the
doctrine should be applied to education. In denying the applicability of
the "separate but equal" doctrine, the Court stated:
In the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but
equal has not place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
6
unequal.
The Court reached this conclusion through a discussion of the develop25.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Supra note 21.
347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.
Kansas.
163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).
Supra note 1.
Supra note 1 at 347 U.S. 495.
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ment of our educational processes since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution with special reference to
the educational opportunities afforded Negro children and to the effect
of segregation on public education:
To separate them [Negro children] from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
7
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
Thus the Brown case held that Negro children denied admission to
white schools solely on the basis of race and color are deprived of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court found it unnecessary to discuss the effect of segregation in
connection with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but in a decision handed down -the same day as the Brown case, it was held
that segregation also violated due process in that it constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.8
Other Supreme Court cases such as Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors
of City Trusts of Philadelphia9 and Henderson v. United States10 have
followed the reasoning and philosophy of the Brown case. The Pennsylvania case was also a school segregation issue but the Henderson case
involved segregation in connection with transportation. The Court held
that segregation in a railroad dining car under railroad regulations is in
violation of a section of the Interstate Commerce Act 1 , which section
makes it unlawful for a railroad engaged in interstate commerce to subject
any particular person to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis12
advantage.
Civil rights has recently become significant in Wyoming too, with the
passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Previous to this legislation, Wyoming had two statutes which dealt with racial segregation. Wyoming
Compiled Statutes, 1045, Section 50-108 provides:
All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mulattoes, Mongolians, or Malays hereafter contracted in the state of Wyoming
are and shall be illegal and void.
A bill was introduced by Senator Normal Barlow in the 1957 Wyoming
legislative session which would have repealed Section 50-108. The bill
was read three times, then referred to committee and returned without
recommendation and placed on the general file, from which it never
emerged.1 3 Thus the Wyoming miscegenation statute is still in effect.
Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, Section 67-624 provided:
7.
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Supra note 1 at 347 U.S. 494.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954).
353 U.S. 230, 77 S.Ct. 806,........... L.Ed. .......... (1957).
339 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 843, 94 L.Ed. 1302 (1950).
Act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 380, as amended 49 U.S.C. § 3 (1952 ed.).
Ibid.
Digest of Senate and House Journals of the Thirty-fourth State Legislature of
Wyoming, 74 (1957).
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When
school
of the
school

there are fifteen (15) or more colored children within any
district, the board of directors thereof, with the approval
county superintendent of schools, may provide a separate
for the instruction of such colored children.

This statute is very similar to other state statutes permitting segregated
schools. It would, of course, have been declared unconstitutional following the Brown case. The Wyoming Legislature, however, has repealed
the statute. 14 Even while the statute was in force, no segregated schools
existed in the state of Wyoming, although some schools are attended predominately by colored children simply because the school is located in
that section of the municipality in which they live."5
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation
of life, liberty or property without due process of law or denial of equal
protection of the laws, apply only to state action and the invasion of the
rights of one person by another who acts as a private individual does not
come within its reach.' 6 Many states, because of this concept, have enacted
civil rights legislation which relates to individual action.
The 1957 Civil Rights Act in Wyoming was originally introduced in
the Senate 17 and entitled: "An Act to Provide for the Equal Treatment
of all Persons in the State of Wyoming." It provided that:
No person of good deportment shall be refused the services or
sales of the necessaries of travel and of life by any public establishment in this state because of race, creed, color or national
origin.
Violations of the act were to be adjudged and punished as misdemeanors,
and it was made the duty of every county and prosecuting attorney to file
complaints when he had knowledge or sworn information of a violation of
the act. The bill was introduced, read and referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which committee recommended an amendment' 8 and Do Pass.
It was next considered in the Committee of the Whole, the amendment was
adopted, but the bill as amended was defeated by a voice vote. The bill
was then indefinitely postponed.' 9
Subsequent to the postponement of civil rights legislation by the
Senate, the Wyoming House of Representatives considered a similar
bill.20 This bill was almost identical to the Senate bill except that it
deleted the words "and travel" and the section making it a duty for
enforcement officials to file complaints. The bill was introduced, read
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

S.L. of Wyo., c. 36 (1955).
Statement by Miss Velma Linford, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, on
November 27, 1957.
Powell v. Utz, 87 F.Supp. 811, 812 (E.D.Wash. 1949).
Senate File No. 7 (1957).
The amendment proposed to delete the section imposing a duty on enforcement
officials to file complaints when they had knowledge or sworn complaints of violations of the act.
Digest of Senate and House Journals of the Thirty-fourth State Legislature of
Wyoming, 16 (1957).
House Bill No. 143 (1957).
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and referred to the House Judiciary Committee. The Committee recommended a Do Pass, it was considered in the Committee of the Whole,
given a Do Pass, read the second and third times and passed. It was then
21
sent to the Senate.
The Senate then reconsidered the civil rights legislation 22 in a bill
which was substantially different from the previous two bills.. It provided
that:
It shall be unlawful to segregate ahy person or persons or discriminate against a person or persons solely because of their
race or creed or color or national origin. Any person acting
contrary hereto shall be liable for actual damages to persons and
property directly resulting therefrom.
This bill was considered and passed and sent to the House where it was
considerably amended and returned to the Senate. The Senate then
passed the act; it was signed by the President and Speaker and approved
by the Governor on February 20, 1957.23
The bill, as finally enacted, provides:
No person of good deportment shall be denied the right of life,
liberty, pursuit of happiness, or the 24necessities of life because of
race, color, creed, or national origin.
The act then goes on to provide, in Section 2, that violations by any
person, firm or corporation shall be deemed misdemeanors and the penalty
is fixed at a fine of not more than $100.00 or a jail term not to exceed
six months, or both.
Several problems of statutory interpretation are suggested by a reading
of this statute:
(1) What is meant by a "person of good deportment"?
(2) What is included in the right of "liberty" so far as the enjoyment
of civil rights is concerned?
(3) What is included in the clause "pursuit of happiness"?
(4) What are "the necessities of life" within the meaning of the
statute?
Before attempting to ascertain the meaning of the phrases just mentioned, it may be helpful to make a general comparison between the
Wyoming Civil Rights Act and similar statutes which have been enacted
by other states.
The section of the New York Civil Rights Law comparable to the
Wyoming act is much more specific than the Wyoming legislation, and
differently constructed. In part, it provides:
21.
22.
23.
24.

Supra note 20 at 154.
Senate File No. 161 (1957).
Supra note 20 at 74.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§ 9-836, 9-837 (Supp. 1957).
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All persons within the jurisdic.tion of this state shall be entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and
privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations estabished by
law and applicable alike to all persons .... 25
The New York Act is restricted in terms to owners, etc., of public accommodations. The Wyoming statute makes quite a different approach, not
restricting its coverage to particular kinds of accommodations or services,
but specifying certain broad types of rights which are not to be denied to
anyone (of good deportment) by any body because of race, color, creed
or national origin.
The New York statute was declared constitutional in People v. King20
27
and further construed in Camp-Of-The-Pines v. New York Times Co.
The Illinois Civil Rights Law provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of said state of Illinois shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment and privileges of
inns, restaurants, eating houses, motels . . .taverns

. . . cafes

. . . and all other places of public accommodations and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established
28
by laws and applicable alike to all citizens ....
The Illinois statute, then, is very similar to that of New York. It specifies
certain places in which the facilities, privileges, etc., shall be equal, and
also adds the general phrase "and all other places of public accommodations
and amusement." The New York act and the Illinois act both differ
from that of Wyoming by omitting the race, color, creed or national origin
phrase and simply providing that "all persons .

.

. shall be entitled to the

full and equal enjoyment" of the facilities described.
In Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 29 the Court of Appeals of Ohio

upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio Civil Rights Act, which is quite
similar to that of New York and Illinois.
The Montana statute, enacted in 1955, provides:
No person, partnership, corporation, association or organization
owning or managing any place of public accommodation or amusement shall discriminate against any person or group of persons
solely on the grounds of race, color or creed. 30
This statute differs from the Wyoming statute in that Wyoming's "of good
deportment" qualification is omitted; and it is limited to places of public
accommodation and amusement.
Colorado Revised Statutes, Section 25-1-1 provides:
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 (1948).
110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888).
184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1955).
Ill.
Rev. Stat. § 38-125 (1955).
165 Ohio St. 150, 136 N.E.2d 344 (1955).
S.L. of Mont., c. 240 (1955).
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All persons within the jurisdiction of the state shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses,
barber shops, public conveyances on land or wa-ter, theatres, and
all other places of public accommodation and amusement, subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law and
applicable alike to all citizens.
This statute, also, is much more specific than the Wyoming statute. "All
persons" are protected; the general phrase "and all other places of public
accommodation and amusement" is included which operates to bring within the statute those facilities not specifically listed.
Other state statutes involving civil rights then are much more specific
than in the Wyoming statute. Our statute provides that persons shall not
be denied the "necessities of life"; other statutes list specific accommodations that are not to be segregated. Our statute uses the words "of good
deportment" and does not define those words; other statutes employ the
phrase "no person" without the qualifying adjectives.
We will next inquire into the meaning which courts have ascribed
to the key phrases used in the Wyoming statute.
(1) The meaning of "person of good deportment."
The courts have spoken of "good behavior" rather than "good deportment." However, behavior has been defined as follows:
The act or manner of behaving, either absolutely or in relation
to others; mode of conducting oneself; conduct; deportment;
manners, carriage . . . correct deportment.3 1 (emphasis supplied)
Thus behavior and deportment may be said to be synonyms. Courts
32
generally have held that good behavior is conduct authorized by law.
It has been defined in terms of propriety, morals, and the requirements of
law. 33 Good behavior means obedience to and conformity with criminal
34
laws of states, the demeanor of law-abiding citizens.
A person, to come within the meaning of the phrase "of good deportment" as used in our statute, would have to be conducting himself according
to our laws with the demeanor of a law-abiding citizen.
(2) What is included in the right of "liberty" so far as the enjoyment
of civil rights is concerned?
The word "liberty" as employed in the United States Constitution and
generally understood in the United States, is a term of comprehensive
scope. 35 It includes, not only freedom from restraint, but the right of
man to use and enjoy all of his faculties. An implied restraint on "liberty"
is regulation by law. "It [liberty] is only freedom from restraint under
31.
32.

Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1956).
United States v. Hrasky, 240 I11.560, 88 N.E. 1031, 1033 (1909).

33.

Ibid.

34.
35.

State v. Millner, 240 N.C. 602, 83 S.E.2d 546, 547 (1954).
Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac. 22 (1904).
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conditions essential to equal enjoyment of the same right by others." 3 6

The application of the word "liberty" to our Civil Rights statute, then,
would mean that no person may be denied freedom from restraint because

of race, color, creed, or national origin; and also that he shall not be
denied the right to use and enjoy all of his faculties as regulated by law.
The difficulty of application in a specific instance is obvious.
(3) What is included in the clause "pursuit of happiness"?
This expression is one of a general nature and the right is not capable
of specific definition or limitation.3 7 This guarantee, though one of the
most indefinite, is also one of the most comprehensive. It includes the
right to use all mental and physical powers to attain happiness except in
so far as may be necessary to secure the equal rights of others.3 8 Thus,
Linder Wyoming's civil rights statute, a person may not be denied, on the
basis of race, color, creed, or national origin, the right to use all of his
mental and physical powers to attain happiness, providing the exercise
of this right does not interfere with the equal rights of others.
(4) What are "the necessities of life" within the meaning of the
statute?
The phrase "necessities of life" is difficult to define in connection
with the civil rights situation. These words have been defined and construed many times, but in connection with divorce and alimony and
contracts made by infants. The term is generally thought to be broad
and elastic.
The term "necessity of life" when used without other definition
is without any certainty or meaning, but varies according to
the financial or social status of the individual, as well as according
to time and place.39
Food, clothing and shelter are usually classified as "necessary per se. '40
In State v. Earnest41 the court held that in construing the term "necessities
of life," it was not enough to show that the article was classified as
necessary per se but it also must be shown that the article was actually
needed at the time. Thus, a person claiming that he was denied a necessity
of life because of his race, his color, his creed, or his natural origin would
have to prove that the article was actually needed at the time, and in an
action brought under the Wyoming Civil Rights statute, the court would
be forced to determine whether the article was needed "according to the
financial or social status of the individual."
A plaintiff bringing an action under our civil rights statute would
have to prove that he was conducting himself with the demeanor of a law36.
37.
38.

Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89, 11. S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620 (1890).
Black's Const. Law, § 145 (3d ed. 1924).
Ibid.

39.

State v. Goldstein, 18 Ala.App. 587, 93 So. 308, 311 (1922).
Court of Alabama to certified question.

40.

State v. Earnest, 162 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. 1942).

41.

Ibid.

Response of Supreme
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abiding citizen and that he was denied his life, his liberty, through
restraint, or denied the right to the use and enjoyment of all his faculties;
his right to pursue happiness, providing that the exercise of that right
did not interfere with the equal rights of others; or that he was denied
an article actually needed according to his financial and social status; all
of these deprivations resulting because of his race, his color, his creed, or
his national origin. The court would seemingly have a difficult task
determining the issue because of the broad and general terms used in the
statute.
It seems evident that the 1957 Wyoming Civil Rights Act is a piece
of compromise legislation, demonstrated by its arduous legislative history
and the lack of specificity in the final enactment. Removing from consideration the definite possibility that the statute may be "void for
vagueness," 42 the most that can be said is that the language of the statute
is so broad and general, and will require so much in the way of judicial
interpretation, that it will not prove to be an effective instrument for the
attainment and preservation of "civil rights."
BETTY

OELAND

PROTECTION FOR THE AUTOMOBILE INSTALLMENT BUYER
In the United States in 1956 the new passenger car registrations totaled
5,955,248. In Wyoming during the same period new car registration
totaled 26,506.1 Used car purchases in the United States amounted to
8,900,000 during 19562 Of all the new and used automobiles purchased
in 1956, 36%o of the purchases were made for cash, 62% were financed by
installment credit or other borrowing, and 2%/ were financed by methods
that were not ascertained.3 It can easily be seen from these figures that
installment sales in the automobile field are of primary importance.
The significant rise in installment financing has led nine states and
the territory of Hawaii to enact legislation controlling the entire field of
installment credit. 4 Thirteen states have passed legislation controlling the
installment financing of automobiles. 5 A declaration by one investigating
42.
1.
2.

3.
4.

2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4920 (3d ed. 1943).
Automobile Facts and Figures, Automobile Manufacturers Association,
ed. 1957).
Id. at 31.

Ibid.

17

(37th

It is interesting to note. that the amount of installment credit has increased

10% since 1950.

Conn. Gen. Stat. c. 311, § 2163c to 68c (Supp. 1953); Idaho Laws, c. 153 (1957);
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 58-901 to 58-934 (1951); Md. Ann. Code Art. 83, § 116 to 152
(1951); Mass. Laws Ann. c. 255, § 11 to 13h (1956) ; N.J. Rev. Stat. § 17:16B-1 to 12
(Supp. 1950) ; N.D. Laws c. 322 (1957); Ohio Rev. Code § 1317.01 to .99 (1953);
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-2a (Supp. 1957) ; Hawaii Laws Art. 98, § I to 30 (1941).
5. Cal. Civil Code § 2981 to 82 (1949) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-16-1 to 10 (1953) ; Iowa
Acts c. 322 (1957) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 190-010 to 190-990 (1956) ; Me. Rev. Stat. c. 60,
§ 305 to 6 (1954); Mich. Laws c. 266 (1957) ; Nev. Stat. c. 346 (1953) ; N.Y. Sess.
Law c. 633 (1956) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 727.010 to 727.990 (1953) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit.
69, § 601 to 37 (Supp. 1951); Va. Code § 46-502 to 504 (1950); Wis. Stat. § 218.01
to 105 (1951).

